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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________ 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Orlando Jacobs has appealed the judgment imposed 
following his conviction for possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  He argues:  (1) that the district court should 
have bifurcated the elements of the offense with which he was 
charged, (2) that, if this bifurcation was denied, the district 
court should have prevented the jury from learning that the prior 
felony conviction alleged in the indictment was for burglary, (3) 
that the district court should have excluded evidence that his 
possession of the firearm occurred during an aborted drug 
transaction, (4) that the district court gave an erroneous 
instruction on the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and (5) that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its 
authority in promulgating the "Armed Career Criminal" provision 
of the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.  We affirm the judgment of 
the district court.   
 
 I. 
 Jacobs was indicted in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania for one count of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The indictment alleged that Jacobs possessed 
  
a .357 magnum revolver on October 22, 1992, after having been 
previously convicted in 1988 in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, for the crime of burglary. 
 Before trial, Jacobs' attorney filed a motion in limine 
to exclude or limit evidence of Jacobs' prior convictions.  
Noting that the government had stated in pretrial submissions 
that Jacobs had two prior felony convictions (for burglary and 
robbery) in addition to the conviction alleged in the indictment, 
the defense made three separate requests.  First, the defense 
asked the court "to sever the element of possession from the 
element of a prior conviction so that the jury [would] determine 
the issue of possession before being informed that Jacobs ha[d] a 
prior conviction."  App. at 313-16 (citing United States v. 
Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992), and United States v. Busic, 
587 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 398 
(1980)). 
 Second, the defense requested that, if severance was 
not granted, the court should nevertheless prevent the jury from 
learning that the prior conviction charged in the indictment was 
for burglary.  See id. at 320-21.  The defense argued that "to 
inform the jury of the nature of his prior conviction [was] 
unnecessary and [would] unfairly prejudice him in violation of 
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and violate his right 
to due process of law."  Id. at 320. 
  
 Third, the defense argued that, if Jacobs chose to 
testify, his prior convictions should not be admitted for 
impeachment purposes under Fed. R. Evid. 609.  See id. at 321-
324. 
 The district court denied these requests.  With respect 
to severance, the court stated that Joshua and Busic were not 
controlling because they "deal[t] with the issue of severing 
other counts," not elements of a single offense.  App. 87-88.  
Turning to the other issues, the court stated: 
   I am going to permit the admission of the prior 
burglary conviction.  We are not going to get into the 
details of how it occurred unless you open that door. 
But the government will offer, I assume, the state 
court papers reflecting the judgment in that court and 
the sentence, and I believe again that is appropriate 
under the circumstances, and I don't believe that any 
prejudice to the defendant exists under the 
circumstances, and if any prejudice does so exist, the 
probative value substantially outweighs any prejudice.  
 
Id. at 88-89. 
 At trial, the prosecution's evidence showed the 
following.  On October 22, 1992, two undercover Pittsburgh police 
officers, George Ciganik and Maurice Jones, were on patrol in an 
unmarked car.  As they approached an intersection, they spotted 
the defendant and two women, Alice Wright and June Coleman.  When 
the officers slowed down, Wright yelled, "[A]re you holding [?]."  
Jones interpreted this statement as referring to narcotics.  
Ciganik answered "no," and Wright then asked, "[A]re you 
looking?"  Ciganik responded "yes," and Wright told the officers 
  
to pull over.  Wright then motioned and spoke to the defendant, 
and walked to within a few feet of her.  
 When Ciganik left the car, however, Wright recognized 
him and shouted to the defendant, "[T]ask force, get out of 
her[e]."  Ciganik took out his badge and shouted that he and his 
partner were police officers, and the defendant then took two 
steps back and appeared to swallow objects.  As Ciganik 
approached with his gun drawn, the defendant pulled a .357 magnum 
revolver from his waistband and pointed it at him.  However, the 
defendant was subsequently disarmed and arrested.  
 The defendant testified at trial on his own behalf and 
disputed this version of the events.  He stated that just before 
his arrest, Wright was arguing with the officers.  According to 
the defendant, Ciganik jumped out of his car, put a gun in the 
defendant's face, told him to open his mouth, "got real mad," and 
then handcuffed him and threw him in the car.  The defendant 
denied having seen the .357 magnum before the trial.  He also 
testified that at the time of his arrest he had a cast on his arm 
and was wearing sweat pants, and he said that the .357 magnum 
could not have fit in the pants' waistband or pockets.  On direct 
examination, the defendant admitted the 1988 burglary conviction, 
stating that he had pled guilty because he was guilty, and on 
cross-examination the prosecutor elicited a similar admission, 
apparently for impeachment purposes. 
  
 Coleman also testified for the defense, but her 
testimony was sketchy.  She said that she, Wright, and the 
defendant were walking together when Wright approached a car and 
then motioned to the defendant.  Coleman said that she kept 
walking and that, when she heard shouting and turned around, 
Wright and the defendant were in custody.   
 The jury found the defendant guilty.  Applying the 
"Armed Career Criminal" provision of the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.4, the district court concluded that Jacobs' guidelines' 
sentencing range was 262 to 327 months, and the court sentenced 
him to imprisonment for 22 years.  This appeal followed. 
 
 
 II. 
 The defendant's first argument is based primarily on 
Busic and Joshua.  In Busic, we stated in dictum that, if a 
defendant is charged with multiple offenses, including one 
requiring proof of a prior felony conviction, the trial judge 
should sever the latter offense unless the conviction would be 
independently admissible with respect to the other charges.  See 
Busic, 587 F.2d at 585.  We noted, however, that one district 
court had addressed this problem by taking the "novel approach" 
of conducting a "two-stage trial, whereby the jury, having 
reached a verdict on the other counts, would then proceed to 
consider the counts requiring proof of prior convictions."  Id.   
  
 In Joshua, we specifically approved this latter 
approach.  In that case, the defendant was charged with (count I) 
armed bank robbery, (count II) use of a firearm during a crime of 
violence, (count III) receipt of a firearm with an obliterated 
serial number, and (count IV) possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  The district court conducted a bifurcated 
trial.  "The jury first heard evidence and deliberated concerning 
the first three counts, and then heard evidence of the 
defendant's criminal record and deliberated concerning Count 
Four."  Id. at 846.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
district court should have severed count IV and conducted an 
entirely separate trial on that charge, but we disagreed and 
wrote: 
   We conclude that the procedure adopted by the 
district court here strikes an appropriate balance 
between the concern about prejudice to the defendant 
and considerations of judicial economy . . . .  The 
defendant's criminal past is not made known to the jury 
until after they have reached a verdict with respect to 
the other charges.  At the same time, this procedure is 
considerably more efficient than conducting an entire 
new jury trial on the weapon possession charge at a 
later date. 
 
Joshua, 976 F.2d at 848. 
 Joshua is not directly applicable to this case because 
here the defendant was charged in a single-count indictment, but 
the defendant maintains that the logic of Joshua required a 
bifurcated trial nevertheless.  He argues: 
   [W]here, as here, a prior conviction is an element of 
the offense, that element should be severed, and the 
jury should be permitted to determine the existence of 
  
the other elements, before learning that the defendant 
has a prior conviction.  The goal of such severance 
would be the same as the goal for severance of counts:  
the insulation of the jury from prejudicial information 
to which it would not otherwise be exposed.  It would 
therefore be a logical extension of Joshua to allow 
severance of elements of the offense. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 9. 
 This precise argument has been rejected by three other 
courts of appeals, and we find their reasoning persuasive.  In 
United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1989), the 
defendant, who had been indicted for possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, "moved to bifurcate the possession element of 
the crime from the element pertaining to his prior convictions."  
Id. at 25-26.  The district court ruled in the defendant's favor 
and entered an order providing that the issue of possession would 
be tried first without any mention of the defendant's prior 
convictions.  If the jury found that the defendant had possessed 
the weapon, "the jury would be brought back to the courtroom and 
the government would be provided a full opportunity to produce 
any admissible evidence as to any aspect of th[e] defendant's 
prior criminal record."  Id. at 26. 
 The First Circuit, proceeding under its mandamus power, 
reversed.  The court observed that neither the parties nor the 
court had located "a single case allowing . . . bifurcation of a 
trial by dividing it along the elements of the crime charged."  
Id. at 27.  The court continued: 
    The dearth of cases, we feel, is because such a 
procedure would result in serious problems.             
. . .  [W]hen a jury is neither read the statute 
  
setting forth the crime nor told of all the elements of 
the crime, it may, justifiably, question whether what 
the accused did was a crime.  The present case is a 
stark example.  Possession of a firearm by most people 
is not a crime.  A juror who owns or who has friends 
and relatives who own firearms may wonder why 
Collamore's possession was illegal.  Doubt as to the 
criminality of Collarmore's conduct may influence the 
jury when it considers the possession element. 
 
Id. at 28. 
 
 The same issue was addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2984 (1993).  Birdsong appealed his conviction 
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and contended 
that the district court had erred in denying his "motion to 
bifurcate the possession issue from the other elements of the 
crime charged."  Id. at 482.  Rejecting this argument, the 
Eleventh Circuit noted that "[a] request to bifurcate the 
presentation of evidence on different elements of a single 
offense is extremely rare."  Id.  The court "specifically 
adopt[ed] the reasoning of the First Circuit in Collamore and 
[held] that the District Court did not err by failing to grant 
the defendant's motion to bifurcate the trial on the elements of 
the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon."  Id. 
 The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
United States  v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1993).  Barker, 
who likewise had been indicted for possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon, filed a motion in limine, requesting that the 
trial judge "bifurcate the `possession' element of the crime from 
  
the `felon' element of the crime," and the district court granted 
his motion.  Id. at 958.  The district court proposed to instruct 
the jury that "the parties have agreed that mere possession [of 
the firearm] is criminal in this case and it is not for [the 
jury] to decide the wisdom of such a law."  Id.  "If the jury 
convicted Barker absent the felony element, Barker would [have] 
then stipulate[d] to the prior felony conviction.  Under this 
scheme, the indictment would not (and indeed could not) [have 
been] read to the jury."  Id. 
 The government sought review of the district court's 
bifurcation order by means of mandamus, and the Ninth Circuit  
granted the government's petition.  See id. at 959.  The court 
observed that the charge against Barker "require[d] the 
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Barker ha[d] 
been convicted of a prior felony" but that the district court's 
order changed "the very nature of the charged offense."  Id.  The 
court held that a "district court may not bifurcate the single 
offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm into multiple 
proceedings."  Id. 
 While our court has not previously considered the 
precise argument raised by the defendant in this case, we 
rejected a very similar argument in United States v. Williams, 
612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980).  
There, the defendant was charged with receipt of a firearm by a 
convicted felon.  His attorney offered to stipulate that the 
  
defendant "was a convicted felon and to preclude thereby any 
mention to the jury of the appellant's felony status either by 
argument of counsel for the government or through instructions to 
the jury by the court on the elements of the crime."  Id. at 740.  
Holding that the government was not required to agree to the 
stipulation, we wrote: 
 First, we perceive no authority for counsel or the 
court to modify a criminal statute enacted by Congress 
by eliminating through stipulation one of the elements 
of the crime.  But even if the proffered stipulation 
did not go so far as to constitute the modification of 
a criminal statute, "The Government was not required to 
accept a judicial admission of the defendant but had a 
right to proffer proof on the point admitted." 
 
Id. (quoting United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 686 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970)); see also United States 
v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
335 (1993). 
 In view of these authorities, we hold that the district 
court in this case acted correctly in denying the defendant's 
bifurcation request. 
 
 III. 
 The defendant argues that, even if bifurcation was not 
required, the district court erred in permitting the jury to 
learn that his prior conviction was for burglary.  We reject this 
argument as well.   
 Some federal criminal offenses, including the offense 
with which the defendant was charged in this case, have as one of 
  
their elements the fact that the defendant was previously 
convicted for another crime.  In a prosecution for an offense 
having such an element, the government generally seeks to 
establish the requisite prior conviction by offering a copy of a 
prior judgment of conviction, and this judgment usually reveals 
the specific offense for which the defendant was previously 
convicted.  Because this judgment goes directly to one of the 
elements needed for conviction, it is unquestionably relevant 
under Fed. R. Evid. 402, but the defense often contends that the 
judgment should nevertheless be excluded in whole or in part 
under Fed. R. Evid. 403 because evidence regarding the specific 
felony for which the defendant was previously convicted is not 
necessary and may be unfairly prejudicial.  Instead of admitting 
an unredacted judgment, it is often argued, the court should 
require redaction of the judgment, require the government to 
accept a stipulation that the defendant was previously convicted 
for an undisclosed felony, or perhaps take judicial notice of the 
fact that the defendant has a prior conviction for an unspecified 
felony.  Faced with such arguments, the courts of appeals have 
handed down decisions that fall into essentially three groups.  
Several courts of appeals have taken the position that evidence 
of the specific felony for which the defendant was previously 
convicted should generally be kept from the jury.1  Other courts 
                     
1
.  The First and Fourth Circuits have so held, and the Second 
Circuit has taken the same view in dictum.  See United States v. 
Lewis, Nos. 93-1819, 93-1820, 1994 WL 650268, at *14 (1st Cir. 
November 14, 1994) (noting that the district court should have 
  
of appeals have held that the question whether to admit such 
evidence is committed to the discretion of the trial judge and 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis.2 Finally, some courts 
of appeals have held that such evidence should be admitted.3  
 Our court has not squarely decided this question,4 but 
our opinion in Williams, which we discussed above, appears most 
closely aligned with the last group of decisions.  The defendant 
in Williams offered to stipulate to a prior felony conviction, 
but his proposal, rather than informing the jury that he had a 
(..continued) 
accepted the defendants' offers to stipulate that they were 
felons); United States v. Rhodes, 32 F.3d 867, 870-871 (4th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(in banc); United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 103 (2nd Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 335 (1993); United States v. Poore, 594 
F.2d 39, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1979). 
2
.  See United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 
1977) ("Whether the government should be required to accept 
defendant's offer to stipulate as to the fact of a prior felony 
conviction is a discretionary matter with the trial court."), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978); United States v. O'Shea, 724 
F.2d 1514, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1984); see also United States v. 
Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (dictum). 
3
.  See United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690-93 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (upholding the rule that "the prosecution has a right 
to refuse a stipulation"); United States v. Flenoid, 718 F.2d 
867, 868 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Blackburn, 592 F.2d 
300, 301 (6th Cir. 1979). 
4
.  The question at issue here -- the admission of evidence 
regarding the type of felony for which a defendant was previously 
convicted when the defendant is charged with an offense having as 
one of the elements the fact that the defendant has a prior 
felony conviction -- is distinct from the question of admitting 
comparable evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).  With respect to 
the latter question, see, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands 
v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1993). 
  
conviction for an undisclosed felony, would have prevented the 
jury from learning that he had any prior felony conviction.  It 
must be noted, however, that in holding that the Williams trial 
judge had properly refused the defense proposal, we wrote broadly 
that "`[t]he Government was not required to accept a judicial 
admission of the defendant but had a right to proffer proof on 
the point admitted.'"  Williams, 612 F.2d at 740, (quoting United 
States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680, 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
400 U.S. 828 (1970)). 
 In any event, we are not required in this case to 
resolve the general question addressed by the other courts of 
appeals.  As noted above (see typescript at 5), Jacobs elected to 
take the stand, and he testified during both direct5 and cross-
examination that he had been convicted in 1988 for burglary.  
Under Rule 609(a)(1), the fact that Jacobs had a prior felony 
conviction and the type of felony involved6 were admissible for 
                     
5
.  There is authority for the proposition that this testimony on 
direct examination constituted a waiver of any objection to the 
admission of the conviction for impeachment, see United States v. 
Williams, 939 F.2d 721, 723-25 (9th Cir. 1991), but since we hold 
that it was admissible for impeachment, we need not reach that 
issue here. 
6
.  Case law firmly establishes that it is proper to admit 
evidence of the type of felony involved in a prior conviction 
used for impeachment under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1).  See 3 C. 
Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 279 at 272 (1994 
(citing cases); 3 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence § 609[05] at 66-67 & n.20 (1994) (same); McCormick, 
Evidence § 43 at 98 (1984) (same); M. Graham, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 6516 at 79 & n.1 (1992 & 1994 Supp.) (same); 
United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659, 670 n.15 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(noting that cross-examination can include "the essential facts 
  
impeachment purposes, subject to Rule 403.  The district court's 
ruling on the Rule 403 question is subject to review for abuse of 
discretion,7  and we find no such abuse here.  Accordingly, there 
was an independent basis for admitting the fact that the 
defendant's prior conviction was for burglary.   
 
 IV. 
 The defendant next argues that the district court erred 
in admitting evidence suggesting that a drug transaction was 
being negotiated just before he allegedly pulled out the revolver 
and was arrested.  The defendant contends that this evidence was 
not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 402 and 404(b) and that it 
should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 403.  We disagree. 
 Evidence tending to show that the defendant was a 
participant in the selling of drugs was relevant under Rule 402 
and was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show that the defendant 
had a motive for carrying a firearm.  Moreover, exclusion of this 
evidence under Rule 403 was not warranted, since this evidence 
had significant probative value that was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
 
(..continued) 
of a prior crime"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).  But see 
M. Graham, supra, § 6516 at 91-96 (suggesting limitation).   
7
.  See United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1003 n.23 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Wilson v. Groaning, 25 
F.2d 581, 586 (7th Cir. 1994), 
  
 V. 
 The defendant maintains that the district court 
violated due process by giving a jury instruction that diluted 
the constitutionally required standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The defendant specifically challenges the use 
of the phrase "moral certainty" in the following portion of the 
instructions: 
 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be of 
such a convincing character that you would be willing 
to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most 
important of your own affairs. 
 
 A reasonable doubt exists whenever, after a careful and 
impartial consideration of all of the evidence in this 
case or lack of it, you do not feel convinced to a 
moral certainty that the defendant is guilty of the 
charge. 
 
App. 291 (emphasis added).   
 Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Victor v. 
Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994), we hold that the district 
court's use of the phrase "moral certainty," although 
inadvisable, did not violate due process.  In Victor, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the convictions of two men, Victor and Sandoval, 
who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in two 
separate jurisdictions.  Both men raised due process challenges 
to jury instructions on reasonable doubt that used the phrase 
"moral certainty."  In considering these arguments, the Supreme 
Court first traced the original nineteenth century meaning of the 
phrase "moral certainty" and concluded that it was essentially 
the same as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 1246.  The 
  
Court recognized that this phrase "is not a mainstay of the 
modern lexicon," id. at 1246, and stated that it did not "condone 
the use of the . . . phrase," id. at 1241, but the Court 
concluded that due process had not been violated in either 
Victor's or Sandoval's case because the instructions in each 
case, taken as a whole, correctly conveyed the concept of 
reasonable doubt to the jury.  See id. at 1243. 
 Addressing a contention virtually identical to the one 
now before us -- i.e., that the phrase "moral certainty" would be 
"understood by modern jurors to mean a standard of proof lower 
than beyond a reasonable doubt" -- the Court pointed to other 
language in the instructions that should have dispelled such an 
interpretation.  Id. at 1247.  In Sandoval's case, the Court 
relied primarily on the statement in the instructions that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt required an "abiding conviction" in the 
defendant's guilt.  Id. at 1247.  In Victor's case, the Court 
relied, not only on this same phrase, see id. at 1250, but also 
on additional language in the instructions.  The Court noted that 
the instructions equated reasonable doubt with "a doubt that 
would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act."  Id. at 
1250-51.  In addition, the Court observed that the jurors had 
been told that they had to be "convinced of Victor's guilt after 
full, fair, and impartial consideration of the evidence" and that 
they should base their decision solely on the evidence introduced 
at trial.  Id. at 1251. 
  
 In the present case, we reach the same conclusion as 
the Supreme Court did in Victor, i.e., that the instructions, 
taken as a whole, adequately conveyed the concept of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt and therefore did not violate due process.  
Here, as in Victor's case, the trial judge equated reasonable 
doubt with a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to 
hesitate to act.  See App. 291.  Furthermore, here, as in 
Victor's case, the trial judge instructed the jurors that they 
had to be convinced of the defendant's guilt after a careful and 
impartial consideration of all the evidence and that they should 
base their decision solely on the evidence presented.  See id. at 
290, 291, 293.  While the trial court in this case did not use 
the phrase "abiding conviction," the court stated that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt must be of a "convincing character," 
stressed the concept of the presumption of innocence, and 
admonished that "a defendant is never to be convicted on mere 
suspicion or conjecture."  Id. at 290-91.  Viewing the 
instructions as a whole, we find them to be similar to those in 
Victor's case and to comport with due process.   
 Our conclusion is not altered by the district court's 
statement that the jury should acquit the defendant if it viewed 
the evidence "as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions, 
one of innocence and the other of guilt."8 Id. at 291.  On 
                     
8
.  Immediately after the portion of the instructions quoted in 
text, the district court stated: 
 
  
appeal, the defendant attacks this statement, contending that its 
implication to lay jurors was that they should acquit only "if 
there [was] a 50-50 chance of innocence."  Appellant's Br. at 37.  
In the district court, however, the defendant did not 
specifically object to this language, much less explain the 
rather subtle argument that he has advanced on appeal, and we 
certainly do not think that the language at issue, standing 
alone, constituted plain error.  Furthermore, to the extent that 
the challenged language carries the implication ascribed to it by 
the defendant, we do not think that the implication is a strong 
one, and accordingly the inclusion of this language in the 
instruction does not persuade us that the instructions as a whole 
are constitutionally deficient. 
 While we thus find no due process violation in this 
case, we must make clear that the instructions employed should no 
longer be given without modification.  In light of the Supreme 
Court's criticism of the phrase "moral certainty," it goes 
without saying that this antiquated phrase should no longer be 
used.  We also note that the "two-inference" language attacked by 
(..continued) 
 So if you view the evidence in this case as reasonably 
permitting either of two conclusions, one of innocence 
and the other of guilt, you should adopt the conclusion 
of innocence and return a verdict of not guilty, 
because a defendant is never to be convicted on mere 
suspicion or conjecture. 
 
Id. at 291.  See 1 E. Devitt, C. Blackmam, M. Wolff, and K. 
O'Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 12.10 at 354 
(1992). 
  
the defendant has been criticized by the Second Circuit,9 and we 
think that this criticism should be heeded as well when it is 
specifically brought to the attention of trial judges in future 
cases. 
 
 VI. 
 The defendant's final argument is that the Sentencing 
Commission lacked the authority to promulgate the "Armed Career 
Criminal" provision of the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4.  Citing 
28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) and (c), which authorize the Commission to 
promulgate guidelines for "categories of offenses," the defendant 
contends that "the Commission is to establish guidelines for 
substantive offenses only" and may not issue guidelines for 
sentencing enhancement statutes.  See Appellant's Br. at 42.  The 
defendant maintains that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 implements 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e), which is a sentencing enhancement provision, see United 
States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 217-20 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 833 (1987), and that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, under which he 
was sentenced, is therefore invalid.  We do not agree. 
 The Sentencing Reform Act required the Commission to 
establish a sentencing range "for each category of offense 
                     
9
.  See United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(noting that "the `two-inference' jury instruction on reasonable 
doubt was improper"); United States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d 809, 
818 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 93 (2d 
Cir. 1987).  The defendant in this case did not call any of these 
decisions to the attention of the trial judge or cite them in his 
appellate brief.   
  
involving each category of defendant."  18 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Section 4B1.4 of the Guidelines defines a 
particular category of defendants, armed career offenders, and 
sets out special rules for calculating their offense levels and 
criminal history categories.  Thus, in every case in which it 
applies, this provision, together with whatever other sections of 
the Guidelines are applicable in that case, establishes a 
sentencing range for the relevant offense (the offense of 
conviction) and the relevant category of defendants (armed career 
offenders).  Accordingly, Section 4B1.4 falls squarely within the 
Commission's authority. 
 
 VII. 
 For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
 
  
United States v. Jacobs, No. 93-3644 
 
MANSMANN, concurring. 
 I concur in the judgment of the majority and in its 
opinion in all respects except one.  I would apply the logic and 
reasoning of our decision in United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 
844 (3d Cir. 1992), to this case and hold that where a trial 
court finds that the introduction of evidence of a defendant's 
prior felony conviction would be unduly prejudicial, such 
evidence may be severed from the trial of the remaining elements 
of an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) offense. 
 In ruling on Jacobs' motion to exclude or limit the 
evidence pertaining to his prior conviction, the district court 
found that Joshua was not controlling because it addressed 
severance of counts of an indictment, rather than the severance 
of elements of an offense, as Jacobs requested here.  In 
addition, the court did not believe that any prejudice to the 
defendant existed under the circumstances and found that, even if 
it did, the probative value substantially outweighed the 
prejudice to the defendant under the circumstances.  (App. 87-
88.)10 
 Although Jacobs was charged in a single count 
indictment, I find that the logic and reasoning of Joshua is 
nonetheless applicable here.  In Joshua we held that in order to 
prevent prejudicing the jury, a count of a multi-count indictment 
which charged possession of a gun by a convicted felon could be 
severed to avoid exposing the jury to the defendant's previous 
conviction for armed bank robbery.  We found that the bifurcated 
trial procedure adopted by the court struck the appropriate 
balance between the concern about prejudice to the defendant and 
considerations of judicial economy.  976 F.2d at 848.   
 Our overriding concern in Joshua was the exposure of 
the jury to prejudicial information.  Specifically, our concern 
was that the necessity of introducing evidence of the defendant's 
criminal record, in order to prove the felon in possession of a 
                     
10
.   In response to the district court's ruling, defense 
counsel made an alternative request.  This request, too, was 
designed to limit the impact of prejudicial information.  Defense 
counsel asked the court to inform the jury that "Jacobs was 
charged with being in possession of a firearm after having 
received a conviction for a crime punishable by more than a year" 
(which is the language of the statute), rather than informing the 
jury that Jacobs had been convicted for burglary.  The court 
denied the request, responding, "I intend to read exactly what 
the indictment charges, which I think is precise and to the 
point."  (App. 88-89). 
  
weapon charge, would prejudice the jury's deliberations on other 
counts.  See also United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577 (3d Cir.), 
rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 398 (1980) (severance could be 
granted where evidence of the prior conviction would not be 
independently admissible with respect to the remaining counts of 
the indictment).   
 The potential for the type of prejudice that concerned 
us in Joshua is the same potential for prejudice that exists in 
this case.  Thus, I do not see any reason for distinguishing 
between a criminal defendant who faces multiple counts of an 
indictment where one count of the indictment alleges a prior 
conviction as an element of the offense, and a criminal defendant 
who is charged in a single count with an offense that has a prior 
conviction as one of its elements.11  Here, there was tremendous 
potential for prejudice to Jacobs from the jury's hearing the 
evidence regarding Jacobs' prior burglary conviction while it was 
deciding whether or not Jacobs possessed the firearm.  The entire 
dispute, in this case, concerned whether Jacobs, in fact, 
possessed the firearm.  At trial, police officers George Ciganik 
and Maurice Jones testified that Jacobs possessed a large 
revolver which he pulled from his waistband and pointed at the 
officers.  (App. 165-66 and 129-30.)  Jacobs took the stand and 
testified that he did not have a gun.  Another witness, June 
Coleman (an unindicted co-conspirator of Jacobs), testified that 
Jacobs did not have a gun and that he was wearing a cast on his 
arm that night.  (App. 229-30.)  In deciding whether or not 
Jacobs possessed the firearm, there was absolutely no need for 
the jury to be informed that Jacobs had a prior criminal 
record.12  In resolving this disputed issue of fact, it is 
                     
11
.   I find the government's argument that the jury needed 
all the elements of the offense before it prior to deliberating 
on a single count, to be without merit.  Severing the elements of 
this offense, or adopting a bifurcated trial procedure, is no 
different from the bifurcation which occurred in Joshua where the 
jury returned verdicts on three counts of the indictment and then 
returned to render a verdict on the fourth count which charged 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 
12
.   Because Jacobs' prior conviction was not relevant to 
the specific issue of whether Jacobs possessed a revolver on 
October 22, 1992, Joshua's requirement that the evidence of the 
prior conviction not be otherwise independently admissible is 
also satisfied.  Indeed, after presentation of the government's 
case-in-chief, (during which evidence of Jacobs' prior burglary 
mentioned in the indictment was admitted), the district court 
granted Jacobs' motion to exclude evidence of his additional 
prior convictions, finding that the prejudicial value of these 
  
possible, and maybe even probable, that the jury was unduly 
influenced by the fact that Jacobs had been previously convicted 
for burglary.  Nonetheless, based on the cold record before us, I 
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 
refusing Jacobs' bifurcation or severance request.  The district 
court is obviously in the best position to decide whether the 
fact or type of prior conviction would unduly influence a jury in 
deciding other elements of an offense.  It is within the district 
court's discretion to decide what procedure should be employed, 
and if any is necessary, to insulate a jury from prejudicial 
information.   
 It has always been within the district court's 
discretion under Federal of Evidence 403 to exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  Moreover, control over the order 
of proof at trial is a matter that is committed to the discretion 
of the trial judge.  United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 246 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); United States v. 
Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 456 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980).  Although 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
requires proof of a prior conviction as an element of this 
offense, I see no reason why a trial court could not require that 
the jury determine the issue of possession before being informed 
that a defendant has a prior conviction.  Accordingly, I would 
extend Joshua's application to indictments which allege a prior 
conviction as an element of the offense. 
 
 
(..continued) 
prior convictions outweighed their probative value.  The court 
found this evidence had "nothing to do with the issue of whether 
the defendant possessed a revolver on October 22, 1992" and the 
court did "not want to impede his [Jacobs'] ability to tell his 
version of what happened."  (App. 223-24.) 
